We revisit the question of what determines the credibility of macroeconomic policies -here, of promises to repay public debt. The literature has focused on governments' strategic decision to default (or erode the value of outstanding debt via inßation/devaluation). It has also focused on increasing policymakers' utility costs as a way to deter strategic misbehavior. By contrast, we build a model in which default or inßation can occur deliberately (for strategic reasons) or unavoidably (shocks leave no other option). In addition, when it does occur, default or inßation entail pecuniary costs, not just utility costs for the policymaker. In the model with these two features, much conventional wisdom on the determinants of credibility need no longer hold. Tough policies sucha as appointing a conservative policymaker, indexing public debt or denominating public debt in foreign currency may reduce, not increase, the credibility of vows to repay debt in full. For some parameter values, these tough policies may also reduce welfare.
Introduction
Credibility is the mother of good policy, or so claims much recent work in macroeconomics and international Þnance. If a government borrows in foreign currency, it has to show a credible commitment to repay. If it borrows in its own currency, it has to show a credible commitment not to inßate or devalue away the real value of the debt.
But ex post, a well-meaning government may Þnd it optimal to default in order to raise spending or reduce the distortions caused by high tax rates. Understanding this temptation, lenders may charge exorbitant risk premia or refuse to extend credit altogether.
How to deal with this so-called time inconsistency problem? 1 The most common approach involves invisible handcuffs: tie the hands of the policy maker to prevent him from acting opportunistically. Monetary examples include rules that punish central bank officials for high inßation, delegation of policy to an anti-inßation conservative, currency boards that peg the value of the currency and eliminate discretionary monetary policy and, if all else fails, the adoption of a foreign currency such as the dollar. Handcuffs to eliminate sovereign risk in international lending are arguably harder to design and apply, but they do exist. IMF conditionality and international Þnes and sanctions on defaulting nations are meant to do precisely that job.
If eliminating opportunistic behavior is the desired goal, the tighter the handcuffs or the bigger the punishment, presumably the less likely the policymaker will misbehave. In the models of Barro and Gordon (1983) , Rogoff (1985) , Fischer and Summers (1989) and Walsh (1995) , among many others, tougher or more rigid policies lead to lower expectations of inßation/devaluation/default. This does not mean, of course, that the most rigid policy is necessarily welfare-maximizing, since in an uncertain economic environment there is a trade-off between the credibility and ßexibility of policies. But it does mean that, the greater the temptation to act opportunistically, the stronger is the case for erring on the side of maximizing credibility, even if it means severely limiting ßexibility. This is the main theoretical justiÞcation for super-rigid systems like the currency board in force in Argentina in 1991-2001. In this paper we argue that this standard approach to credibility is incom-plete and therefore ßawed. Two realistic features are missing from almost all work on the subject. The Þrst is that sometimes governments devalue/default not because they want to, but because they have to. If expenditure is unexpectedly high (war calling for high defense expenditures, recession causing an increase in unemployment compensation payments) and tax revenues cannot be increased accordingly (either because of political constraints or because the economy is at the top of its Laffer curve), then default may be inevitable even for a non-opportunistic government.
A second crucial point is that the costs of misbehavior are pecuniary and involve more that a utility loss for the policymaker, as much of the literature assumes. Again the example of Argentina may be relevant. Once it abandoned its currency board in 2002, there was surely loss of face for the country vis a vis the rest of the world and much discomfort for policymakers, both present and past. But the currency board was so hard to leave behind precisely because its abandonment involved other very large pecuniary costs: the breaking or rewriting of contracts, massive redistributions of wealth between some borrowers and lenders, the paralysis of the Þnancial system for months and, soon thereafter, a mega recession that decimated government revenue.
Putting these two factors together leads to a new and different view of the relationship between policy rules and credibility. Consider the following setup, which is a much simpliÞed version of the model we study below. The government has debt outstanding, a share θ of which is indexed while a share 1 − θ is nominal and can be defaulted on via inßation or devaluation. What remains must be Þnanced via conventional taxes. Government spending is stochastic. The policy rule in force allows for inßation of up to x percent, but calls for paying a pecuniary cost c if inßation is ever above x. The amount c is paid by the government out of Þscal resources. The smaller is x or the larger is c, the tougher the policy. Social welfare is decreasing in the rates of inßation and conventional taxation.
In low-spending states of the world, there is no crisis: the government meets its obligations through tax collection and inßation below x. But in high-spending states the economy is in a Þscal crisis: after raising all possible taxes, the government is forced to inßate more than x and incur an additional cost c. Notice that since this cost worsens the Þscal balance, the inßation rate required to restore Þscal equilibrium after the crisis is increasing in c.
Such an economy behaves very differently than standard theory suggests:
• Expected inßation (with the expectation computed across crisis and non-crisis states) can be decreasing in x. This is because the lower is x the more often crises occur, since large inßation rates cannot be used to respond to shocks without violating the rule. And the more often crises occur, the more often c is paid. If one thinks of conservatives as choosing a lower x (as we do below), then appointing a more conservative policymaker can raise expectations of inßation. This is exactly the opposite of what Rogoff (1985) , Fischer and Summers (1989) , Walsh (1995) and others found.
• As long as expected inßation is decreasing in x, there is no trade-off between credibility and ßexibility of policy. On the contrary, making the policy more ßexible by raising x also enhances credibility. In fact, in the range in which expected inßation is decreasing in x, expected social welfare is maximized by choosing the highest x in that range.
• If again we think of policymaker preferences determining the chosen x, it is not necessarily the case that social welfare is maximized by choosing a policymaker who is more conservative (inßation-averse) than society as a whole, as Rogoff (1985) and Walsh (1995) argued. In fact, the welfare-maximizing policymaker may well be more liberal than society as a whole.
• Expected inßation can be increasing in θ, the share of indexed or foreign currency debt in total public debt. This is because in an uncertain environment Þscal crises occur with positive probability, and the higher is the share of indexed debt the larger is the inßation required to restore Þscal solvency in crisis situations. This result is exactly the opposite of Calvo (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and of much conventional wisdom, which argue for indexing or denominating debt in foreign currency as a way to enhance credibility.
• As long as expected inßation is increasing in θ, there is no trade-off between credibility and ßexibility of policy. On the contrary, making the policy more ßexible by reducing θ also enhances credibility. In fact, in the range in which expected inßation is increasing in θ, expected social welfare is maximized by choosing the lowest θ in that range.
• A higher cost c can cause self-fulÞlling inßation crises. Two equilibria with distinct expected rates of inßation and expected social loss (which can be Pareto-ranked) obtain if c is above a certain level. The intuition is that expecting high inßation raises interest rates and raises the Þscal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high cost c will be paid and high inßation will occur. This result is in contrast to the results in Obstfeld (1997) and Velasco (1996) , where a sufficiently high cost of inßating ensures low and unique expectations of inßation.
There is a long and distinguished literature that studies the time inconsistency of Þscal and monetary policies, beginning with the classic papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) , Calvo (1978) and Lucas and Stokey (1983 Uribe (2002) . But none of these papers considers the role of crises, deÞned above as random events that force the policymaker to deviate from his chosen policy rule. Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and Bohn (1990) study the optimal composition of government debt between nominal and indexed securities. Bohn (1990) showed that nominal debt can mimic the effects of contingent debt. Having nominal debt gives governments ßexibility in dealing with the debt burden when there are shocks. But, as we know from the work of Calvo and Guidotti (1990) and others, nominal debt creates the incentive for government to erode its real value for time inconsistency reasons. So nominal debt, while good for ßexibility, is presumably bad for credibility. The way to deal with the credibility problem, claims almost all literature until now, is to adopt tough policies. One such tough policy is to restrict issuance of nominal debt, even if this reduces ßexibility. Our point is that restricting the use nominal debt may not just reduce ßexibility, but may also reduce credibility. In this sense our conclusion is very different from Bohn's.
Drazen and Masson (1994) make a point that is related to ours: if economic outcomes are persistent, then following tough policies today may reduce the credibility of vows to follow tough policies in the future. Consider what happens if, other things equal, higher unemployment today means higher unemployment tomorrow. Then if a tough policy raises unemployment today (and therefore tomorrow), the cost of being tough again tomorrow goes up, and so does the likelihood that the policymaker will renege on its promises and choose not to act tough. It is in this sense that too tough a policy can be counterproductive. 2 But in Drazen and Masson (1994) , the only kind of deviation is opportunistic: if things get sufficiently bad policymakers optimally choose to inßate or devalue. There are no crises which force the policymaker to devalue, as can happen in this paper. There are technical differences as well. Drazen and Masson work with a signaling model in which the public is uncertain about the policymaker's type. In our model there is full information about the preferences of the policymaker.
Related arguments can also be found in the corporate Þnance literature. An example is in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) , who study the incentives to avoid default in a setup in which sometimes default is beyond a manager's control. The optimal contract has to trade-off the beneÞts of large default penalties (they deter strategic default) with the costs (such penalties may have to be paid if default happens in equilibrium even if the manager did not want to default). There are also similarities with poison pill strategies to prevent hostile takeovers: too poisonous a pill may lower the expected value of the Þrm.
Our paper also has antecedents in the Þnancial crises literature. Self-fulÞlling debt and currency crises -involving multiple equilibria-are studied by Calvo (1988) , Alesina, Prati and Tabellini (1990) , Cole and Kehoe (1996), Velasco (1996) and Obstfeld (1997) among many others. But in all those papers giving the government the power to precommit -or imposing sufficiently severe punishments to ensure discretionary policy mimics which would be chosen under commitment-is sufficient to rule out multiplicity. The opposite is true in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model, while sections 3 presents an example of equilibria under a uniform distribution of shocks. Section 4 analyzes the consequences of policy alternatives (appointing conservative policymakers and indexing debt) under the simplifying assumptions of a constant and exogenous cost of misbehavior. Section 5 endogenizes this cost and analyzes policy options, while 6 concludes.
The model
The government budget constraint is
where b = inherited public debt coming due, g = exogenous net expenditure, τ = policy-determined tax revenue, and z = random Þscal shock, all denominated in terms of the economy's single tradeable good. 3 The variable δ is the actual inßation/devaluation/default rate applied by the government, while δ e is the expected value of this variable, which translates into the risk premium charged on the debt. Hence, on the LHS of (1)is the total Þscal burden, while the on RHS are total Þscal resources, which include tax revenue and proceeds from inßation/devaluation/default. The budget shock may have to do with random ßuctuations in expenditures (war, natural disasters calling for higher transfer payments, recessions requiring higher unemployment compensation) or random ßuctuations in revenues (commodity price shocks affecting the proÞts of state enterprises, recessions causing lower value-added tax receipts). Assume that z has a p.d.f. f (z) with mean zero, upper boundz and lower bound z.
Notice that, in the interest of realism, there are no contingent debt contracts. Though we do not model the point explicitly, the assumption could be justiÞed to imperfections in information that limit contractibility.
The parameter θ, 0 ≤ θ < 1, which lies between 0 and 1, indicates how much of the total debt is denominated in foreign currency or indexed, while a fraction 1 − θ is denominated in domestic currency (or subject to a possible default). If all debt is in domestic currency, for instance, θ = 0, and a inßation surprise of (δ e − δ) yields b (δ e − δ) net revenue (in units of output) for the government. As as θ → 1, so that almost all debt is indexed or denominated in foreign currency, inßation surprise yields almost no real net revenue. If outright default and not inßation is involved, a low θ indicates that the Þnes and legal fees associated with unexpected default are small, so that a given rate of surprise default yields a relatively large amount of revenue. The opposite is true if θ is high. If the actual inßation/default rate is fully anticipated, so that δ e = δ, then government still has to pay all inherited public debt b. From now we will speak of inßation only, but the reader should keep in mind our result can also be interpreted in terms of devaluation or outright default. We will refer to δ e as expected inßation or the inßation premium, but under the alternative interpretation it would be the devaluation premium or the country risk premium. The larger δ e , the lower the credibility of policies.
We make two key assumptions, on which much of our story hangs:
1 Upper bound on tax revenue: τ ≤τ . This limit can arise because of political constraints on further tax collection or because the economy Þnds itself at the top of the Laffer curve. If the government ever hits this constraint, it enters a Þscal crisis. In that case, it has no option but to inßate, devalue or default.
2 Cost of crises: a Þscal crisis increases the government's liabilities by an amount c ≥ 0. In the next two sections we treat c as exogenous, but endogenize it later. One interpretation is that this c includes all those other liabilities that are easily and cheaply postponed or "rolled over" under normal circumstances, but not so under a Þscal crisis. An alternative is that the IMF or some external monitoring agency refuses to roll over short-term credits if the government violates Þscal conditionality. Or the surprise inßation that comes with a Þscal crisis could cause losses in the domestic private sector (especially in local banks), which are soon transferred to the government because of political pressures or concerns over the health of the payments system.
To avoid considering uninteresting sub-cases, we make the following additional assumption about the size ofτ :
Þnance its other expenditures, even if the Þscal shock is as adverse as can be. Notice that this assumption places limits on how high θ can be, givenτ and the support of the shock (in particular,z). In all the simulations we present below, where we assume a given support, we choose parameters that satisfy this inequality.
Finally, we must specify the preferences of local residents and of the government. Citizens have the loss function
where 0 < α s < 1. Quite naturally, loss is increasing in both inßation and taxes. Note that δ is costly even if debt is owed to foreigners, because of standard cost-of-inßation arguments, or because of the other distortions/costs a default might bring. We include the constant b only as a normalization that simpliÞes the required algebra.. The government has a loss function that is identical to (2) except that the weight α it places on inßation need not equal α s . The policy problem then boils down to minimizing that loss function subject to the budget constraint, the upper bound on tax collection, and to private sector inßation expectations.
The timing of actions is as follows. The stock of debt b and the share 1 − θ of nominal debt are predetermined. Expectations are formed at the beginning of the period, before uncertainty is realized. Then the shock hits. After observing the shock, the policymaker chooses her preferred δ and τ . Notice that because he moves after expectations are set and cannot commit to a course of action, the policymaker's optimal plan will suffer from the adverse consequences of time inconsistency: more inßation and higher social loss than under commitment. It is this problem that policies such as appointing a conservative central banker or indexing debt attempt to solve.
Computing equilibrium
Computing the policymaker's preferred discretionary strategy is simple. If not against the maximum tax constraint (τ <τ ), he chooses tax and inßation rates according to
These rules nest some intuitive and common examples. For instance, if α = 1 (inßation or default very costly for the policymaker) or if θ = 1 (debt totally indexed or denominated in foreign currency), the policy involves inßation equal to its negative bliss point. Notice that rule (3) entails an inßation bias (E (x) > 0) which results from the government's myopia (it takes x e as given when solving its minimization problem).
From now on we refer to (3) and (4) as the policy rules. They are the rules, known by the public, the government will follow as long as it can. Deviating from these rules will prompt a punishment or cost c. As discussed above, the idea is that both local residents and foreign creditors know (3) and (4) and can observe if they are being followed. If they are not, all kinds of undesirable economic consequences occur.
DeÞne z * as the realization of expenditure such that taxes are at their maximum level:
This level z * is a trigger or threshold. DeÞne also z min as the most favorable possible realization of the shock for which inßation is still positive:
We have then that if z min ≤ z ≤ z * , then the Þscal situation is strong and policy rules (4) and (3) determine τ and x. 5 But if the shock is larger and z > z * , then the economy is in a Þscal crisis and τ =τ . In this case, the government cannot abide by (3) and (4) above. Actual inßation revenue is given by
where now c must be paid out of government resources. Figure 1 shows x as a function of the shock z. The Þgure depicts two distinct regions. DeÞne z min ≤ z ≤ z * as the no crisis region and the range z > z * as the crisis region. Denote the probability of the former as p nc and the probability of the later as p c . 6 Next we pin down expected inßation. Rational expectations dictate that
where the threshold z * is given by 5.
What is the shape of this schedule? Using Leibnitz's rule one can calculate
so that E(x|x e ) is increasing in x e . The second derivative of E(x|x e ) is
If in addition f 0 (z) ≤ 0 (which is satisÞed for many commonly used distributions: uniform and Poisson are two examples), E(x|x e ) is convex in x e as long as z * ≥ z.
As x e grows, eventually z * < z; in that range, E(x|x e ) is a straight line with slope equal to one (in other words, in that range E(x|x e ) = b + g + x e + c −τ ).
Equilibrium expected inßation (x e eq ) is given by
There are three possible cases:
• Case 1: One equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2 .1. In this case, 0 < ∂E(x|x e ) ∂x e ≤ 1 at the equilibrium x e . Therefore, shifting up the E(x|x e ) curve (for instance by raising b or g) results in a larger x e eq . This case holds if and only if c <τ − b − g (recall the quantity on the RHS is positive by assumption). In words, c has to be relatively small.
• Case 2: No equilibrium, as depicted in Figure 2. 2. This is the case of a very large c.
• Case 3: Two equilibria, as depicted in Figure 2 An important implication of this is that a sufficiently large c can cause multiple equilibria, possibly shifting the economy from Case 1 to Case 3. The intuition is that starting from a position of equilibrium, expecting higher inßation raises the Þscal burden, lowering the threshold between crisis and non-crisis states. This in turn increases the probability that the high cost c will be paid and a large inßation will occur, thereby making the initial increase in expected inßation self-validating. 7 If a second equilibrium exists and bad "animal spirits" can cause a shift to it, self-fulÞlling pessimism could cause crises. 8 .
For future use, note that expected social loss can be written compactly as
where the extended expression is in the appendix. Recall z * and x e are also functions of λ. Expected loss depends on what share of the Þscal burden is Þnanced by inßation in non-crisis states, what the threshold is between crisis and non-crisis states, and what the expectation of inßation is across all states.
Equilibria: an example
To gain more insight into the sources of multiplicity of equilibria, consider the following example. Suppose the distribution of z is uniform, with lower bound −z and upper boundz. Inßation premium equation (8) then implies
where ∆ z ≡z + z * is the length of the interval in which no Þscal crises occur. At the same time, trigger equation (5) is
These equations are depicted in Figure 3 . It is easy to prove that the function labeled DR (for expected devaluation/inßation revenue) is positive, decreasing, convex, continuous and differentiable in the interval (0, 2z). These properties imply that a unique equilibrium exists as long as that IR crosses the vertical axis above the function labeled TR (for trigger). This last condition is equivalent toτ > b + g + c. This conÞrms for this example our earlier general Þnding that uniqueness requires that the cost c be sufficiently small. 9 5 The effects of policy Policies affecting λ, b, g orτ result in shifts of E(x|x e ), and they change equilibrium expected inßation and expected social loss. Next we examine 9 In this particularly simple case, the endogenous variables have closed-form solutions.
If TR cuts DR to the left ofτ
Alternatively, if TR cuts DR to the right ofτ (1 − λ) −1 , the solution is:
With these results, expected devaluation can be computed using 14 in the text.
the effects of some of these policies. In this section we assume away the issue of multiplicity of equilibria and focus on cases in which uniqueness obtains. Before looking at comparative statics, notice that the conventional model is a special case of our model: the case in whichτ is sufficiently large, so that there are no Þscal crises. In that case policy rule (3) holds in all states. Taking expectations on both sides of that expression, using the deÞnitions of λ and of x e , and rearranging we have that
where we have we have written λ as a function (recall it is an increasing function) of α and θ. It is clear, then, that δ e is unambiguously decreasing in α and θ. A more conservative policymaker is associated with lower expected inßation/default. The intuition is obvious: the more the policymaker dislikes inßation, the less of it he engineers in equilibrium. Similarly, a lower share of nominal debt (a higher θ) reduces expected inßation/default. The intuition is that with higher θ inßation surprises yield less real revenue, so they are used less in equilibrium. This is similar to the results of Calvo (1988) and Fischer and Summers (1989) . It turns out that these conventional results can be overturned in our model.
A conservative policymaker à la Rogoff
A conservative policymaker à la Rogoff has a high α and therefore suffers big utility losses from inßation. If α > α s , he suffers more from inßation than does the population at large. What are the effects of delegating policy to someone with such preferences? Recall that λ is increasing in α and that x e = (1 − θ)δ e b. Therefore, for a given θ, the change in δ e with respect to α is proportional to the change in x e with respect to λ. 10 In what follows we focus on dx e dλ for simplicity. From equation (8) we can compute
If c is large enough, the derivative is positive. That means that an increase in α, with the consequent increase in λ, shifts up E(x|x e ) and therefore 10 That is,
increases x e . With sufficiently large costs of crises, the appointment of a more conservative policy-maker à la Rogoff increases expected inßation. The intuition is as follows. Comparing two economies under different policy regimes, one with a conservative policy maker (high α) and another with a lax policymaker (low α), we see three possible outcomes depending on the realization of z:
• If the shock z is small enough, neither economy is in a Þscal crisis. In this case, the economy with the more conservative policymaker has less inßation.
• If the shock z is large enough, both economies are in a Þscal crisis. In this case, both economies have the same amount of inßation.
• If the shock is of intermediate size, then the economy with the lax policymaker is not in crisis, but that with the conservative policymaker is. In this case, the latter economy has higher expected inßation if c is large.
In computing expectations, agents average across these three possible situations. With sufficiently large costs c, the relatively high inßation suffered by conservative policymakers when in the third situation more than offsets the relatively low inßation they enjoy when in the Þrst situation, so that "on average" conservatives engineer more inßation, and this is rationally anticipated by the public. This line of reasoning also makes clear why, if c = 0, conservatives always deliver lower expected inßation. 11 The upper panels in Þgures 4 and 5 illustrate both possible cases. Again we use a uniform distribution with support [−z,z]. Figure 4 involves a case 11 The result can also be seen by writing the condition for ∂E(x|x e ) ∂λ > 0 (equation (17)) as
∂z * ∂λ using the fact that, for a given x e , ∂z * ∂λ = −τ λ 2 . The LHS is the marginal reduction in expected inßation when λ increases and no crisis takes place. It is positive, for more conservative (higher λ) policymakers default less when there is no crisis. The RHS is the marginal increase in expected costs (Þnanced via inßation) associated to marginally more conservative government. It is also a positive number, since ∂z * ∂λ < 0 . In words, more conservative policymakers are in crisis more often. If the latter effect exceeds the former, then a more conservative policy maker delivers higher expected inßation.
with relatively highτ and c = 0. This means that, for a givenz, crises do not happen often, and when they do they involve zero costs. As the Þgure shows, expected inßation is always decreasing in α.
The example in Figure 5 is the same as that in Figure 4 , except for a lower maximum tax revenueτ and a large c. For low α's the traditional result holds and a more conservative policymaker delivers lower expected inßation. But for α's larger than 0.41 the opposite happens and a more conservative policy maker delivers higher expected inßation.
What about the consequences for welfare? Recall Rogoff showed that, in the presence of time inconsistency, the policymaker that delivers the highest social welfare is one who has more conservative preferences than society as a whole. That celebrated result need not hold here. In the appendix we compute the impact of changes in λ on expected social loss:
The appendix also shows that Λ λ is negative (positive) if α is smaller (larger) than α s . This is natural, since λ represents a maximum for the case α = α s . It follows the Þrst term on the RHS of this expression is positive for α > α s . So is the second term, since ∂z * ∂λ = −τ λ 2 < 0. In the third term, the expression in parentheses is always positive (recall that Λ x e > 0 and Λ z * < 0), so the sign of the third term depends on whether dx e dλ is positive or negative. So in general the result can go either way. To make progress evaluate dE(L) dλ in the neighborhood of the point α = α s , where the policymaker and the public have the same preferences. We then have
The celebrated Rogoff result is a special case of this expression when c = 0.
In that situation, Λ z * = 0 and dx e dλ¯α =α s < 0, so the RHS of (19) is unambiguously negative. Social loss falls as the policymaker becomes marginally more conservative than society as a whole. This situation is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 4 , where we have assumed α s = 0.5, and where the socially optimal level of α is equal to 0.65.
If c > 0, on the other hand, we have two sub-cases. If dx e dλ¯α =α s < 0, so that the conventional link between expected inßation and policymaker preferences obtains, the RHS has an ambiguous sign. It pays off to be more conservative than society if and only if the cost c is small (so that Λ z * is close to zero) while − dx e dλ¯α =α s is large (a more conservative policymaker sharply reduces expected inßation).
The other sub-case obtains when dx e dλ¯α =α s > 0, so that we have the nonconventional result that greater liberalism causes expected inßation to fall. In that case, the RHS of (19) is unambiguously positive. The social optimum involves a policymaker who is more liberal than society as a whole. This case is illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 5 , where we again assumed α s = 0.5, and where the socially optimal level of α is equal to 0.41.
Indexed or foreign currency debt
What effects does the policy have of increasingly indexing debt (raising θ)?
We know that θ affects x e only through λ and that δ e = x e (1−θ)b . This implies that greater indexation reduces inßation expectations if and only if the elasticity of x e with respect to λ is smaller than a negative constant. 12 So even if c is zero and this elasticity is therefore negative, greater indexation may increase the expected inßation rate.
The intuition is that now changing θ not only alters λ, and therefore the share of government obligations that is Þnanced via inßation. Changing θ also changes the stock of debt that can be inßated away, so that for every unit of real revenue the government hopes to get from inßation, higher indexation (raising θ) requires a higher inßation rate.
In a crisis the inßation rate is not for the policymaker to choose, but given by revenue needs. It follows that, for a given amount of required revenue, the inßation rate in crises is higher the larger is the share θ of indexed or foreign currency debt. In addition, a larger θ means that the threshold z * falls, so that the economy is in crises more often. Either or both of these effects can offset the standard Fischer-Summers type of result, causing expected 12 Formally, the necessary calculation is
inßation to rise as the share of indexed or dollarized debt increases. An example of this can be seen in the top panel of Figure 6 , where the schedule has an upward-sloping portion. 13 What about the welfare implications of indexing liabilities or denominating them in foreign currency? The appendix shows that
where recall from the deÞnition of λ that dλ dθ > 0. 14 The appendix also shows that the last term in (20) , Λ θ , is positive. It follows that the welfare analysis of indexation/dollarization is the same as the welfare analysis of policymaker conservatism, but with a twist. There is now an additional effect: for a given λ, increasing θ always increases social loss, since it is the attempted inßation (δb) not its actual yield (θδb) that enters social loss.
Other things equal, then, trying to lower expected inßation and increase welfare via greater indexation of debt is a trickier business than doing so via a more conservative policymaker. Consider for simplicity the case in which α = α s , and therefore dE(L s ) dλ is positive if dx e dλ is positive. It follows that whenever expected inßation is increasing in λ and therefore in θ, overall expected social loss is increasing in θ. In other words, in the range of θ for which ∂x e ∂λ is positive, it pays off to have as little indexation as possible. Notice that if there is no cost of crises (c = 0), expression (20) becomes
We know the Þrst term on the RHS is (in this case) negative, and the second term on the RHS is always positive. It follows the net effect can have either sign, and for certain parameter values greater indexation can be bad for welfare even if crises are costless. This case is depicted in the lower panel of Figure 6 , in which expected social loss is decreasing in θ until this share hits 0.48, and increases thereafter. 13 Note however that if c = 0 changing the threshold has no impact on δ e , so that in Figure 6 the upward-sloping portion comes exclusively from the Þrst effect. 14 The exact expression is dλ dθ = 2
6 Endogenizing the cost of default So far we have treated the cost c of a crisis as exogenous. But it can easily be endogenized by appealing to incentive effects.
It is not always feasible to Þnd a tough central banker or Þnance minister who has a strong dislike of inßation or default. That person may not exist, or he may be inevitably changed once in power. Instead an external agency, such as the IMF, may attempt to commit the government to a low inßation rate by imposing a penalty for c for deviations.
Suppose that the IMF wants to induce the government to follow a given policy rule, characterized by a given α (call it α f ) and its associated λ (call it λ f ). If the government ever deviates from this policy, then it must pay the cost c. Naturally, the IMF will wish to impose the smallest c that ensures the rule is followed as long as possible. 15 The appendix shows that for each chosen λ f there is a c * equal to
where ω ³ λ f , λ´> 0 is a function of λ f and λ. As long as the cost of deviating is no smaller than c * , the government will always attempt to stick to the policy dictated by the IMF. From the deÞnition of ω ³ λ f , λ´in the appendix it follows that this function is increasing in λ f if and only if λ f > λ. Hence, if the IMF wants to raise λ f above λ, it must also increase c * .
What is the effect of a higher λ f on expectations of inßation? Consider the total derivative of E(x|x e ) with respect to λ f , which is now
where ω λ f is the derivative if the ω function with respect to λ f . The sign of this derivative depends on λ f itself. A more ambitious target (a higher α f , meaning a higher λ f ) may cause expectations of default to fall or rise. One can show that imposing a tighter policy starting from λ f = λ reduces E(x|x e ). This is because the required marginal increase in c * , starting from λ f = λ, is zero. But a 'zero tolerance' policy of λ f = 1 can backÞre: for some parameter values, a decrease in λ f is required to reduce expectations of inßation. An example appears in the top panel of Figure 7 , where expected inßation Þrst falls and then rises as α f (and therefore λ f ) increases.
What are the implications for welfare? Should the IMF force the local policymaker to act more conservatively than the policymaker naturally would? We can use the same technique as in earlier sections, calculating
where it is easy to check from (27) that Λ c > 0. 16 Focus Þrst on the case with α = α s , so that the government has the same preferences as society. Given that the marginal increase in the cost needed to implement a slightly higher λ is zero, (24) becomes
which is negative since ∂x e ∂λ f < 0 for c = 0. Therefore, having the IMF induce a policy that is more conservative than both society and the government is optimal. That is, if α = α s , the best α f is α f > α. The intuition is that raising the policymakers α to α f > α has marginal beneÞts and costs. The marginal beneÞt is that in non-crisis situations, a more conservative policymaker ameliorates the time inconsistency problem. 17 The marginal cost is that in crisis situations a cost c has to be paid, and the more conservative the policymaker is, the more often crises happen. But starting at α f = α this marginal cost is zero, since the marginal increase in c required to make that α f sustainable is zero. 18 This case appears in the lower panel of Figure  7 .
But if the government is naturally more liberal than society, so that α < α s , then we have
This expression can be positive or negative, since the sum of the Þrst two terms, as we know, is of ambiguous sign, and Λ c > 0. That is, having the IMF induce a policy that is more conservative than society is welfare-decreasing if the government is sufficiently liberal, so that the c needed to sustain the IMF policy is large. What is the connection between how tough an IMF program is and uniqueness of equilibria? It turns out that a sufficiently tough or ambitious program -that is, one with a high α f -can cause multiple equilibria. The intuition is that forcing a government to behave much more conservatively than it would if left to its own devices calls for a large cost c. And, as we saw in sections 2 and 3 above, a large enough c can generate multiple equilibria. Just as in those sections, the intuition is that expectations of high inßation raise the Þscal burden, shifting the threshold between crisis and non-crisis states. A large c is then paid with higher probability, worsening the expected Þscal burden and potentially rendering the pessimistic expectations self-conÞrming.
This result stands in contrast with those of Obstfeld (1997) . In that paper, escape clauses with exogenous costs can involve self-fulÞlling attacks on Þxed exchange rates if those costs are sufficiently small. In Obstfeld's paper escape costs are non-pecuniary and affect the policymaker's utility only. The higher the cost, the less willing is the policymaker to validate high inßation expectations. Here escape costs are pecuniary and they affect the government's budget constraint. This is precisely why these high costs allow pessimistic expectations to be self-validating.
An example of this phenomenon appears in Figure 8 . As α f (and therefore λ f ) increase expected inßation falls, but for very high α f (very conservative IMF programs) the equilibrium is no longer unique. There is an alternative outcome that yields higher expected inßation and higher expected social loss. In that range, which equilibrium obtains depends exclusively on animal spirits. By being more ambitious, the IMF may unwittingly increase the very expected inßation it was attempting to reduce.
Conclusions
Do tough policies always deliver higher credibility, lower expectations of inßation, devaluation and default, and possibly higher welfare? Conventional wisdom says yes. The model in this paper suggests otherwise. In an uncertain environment in which Þscal crises are both possible and costly, tough policies -such as greater policymaker conservatism and a higher share of debt that is indexed or denominated in foreign currency-can easily backÞre, causing higher expected inßation and lower welfare.
This does not mean that any toughening of policies is counterproductive. On the contrary, we have shown that the relationship between expected inßation and expected social loss, on the one hand, and the toughness of policies, on the other, can be non-monotonic and quite sensitive to changes in underlying parameters. But our results do suggest that toughness beyond a certain point may be welfare reducing, and that this threshold may be different from what conventional theory suggests. For instance, the well-known result that it is welfare-improving to appoint a conservative policy-maker need not hold here.
Not all tough policies are created equal. The paper also suggests that indexing or dollarizing debt may be particularly tricky. Appointing a conservative policymaker may cause crises to occur more often, but has no implications for the ability of the government to default/devalue as needed in times of crisis. That is why conservatism may be welfare-improving if the Þscal costs of crisis are small, as we show in section 4. Indexation of debts or measures such as facilitating the imposition of sanctions or penalties on defaulting nations, reduce the revenue collected by governments for every possible inßation rate. This means that, other things equal, default rates are higher at times of crisis, and expected inßation and expected social loss may well be higher. 19 We have developed the argument in terms of a Þscal problem, but the same logic could be applied more broadly. For instance, it could be applied to the inßation-unemployment trade-off for which the idea of time inconsistency was originally developed. If the expectations-augmented Phillips curve is subject to shocks and if there is a politically-dictated upper bound to the rate of unemployment (as their arguably is in the real world), then a very similar story applies. Policies such as indexing wages to insulate them from inßation, thereby making inßation surprises useless in terms of creating employment, could also be counter-productive. But the expression in square brackets is equal to dE(L) dλ , yielding (20) in the text. The last term on the RHS of 30 can be easily computed to be
Equation (36) deÞnes the lowest feasible c, which we call c * . Note that if λ f = λ, ψ = 1, so deviation is never preferred (given that c is non-negative).
It is straightforward to show that, given the deÞnition of ψ, the function ω 
